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Problem Overview
This paper attempts to examine a correlation between lockdown length and COVID-19
case rate, death rate and fatality rate. In March of 2020, the publishing of alarmist
epidemiological models prompted government officials to enact sweeping emergency measures
(Miltimore 2020). Notably, the Imperial College London model published by epidemiologist
Neil Ferguson predicted a “best-case scenario” of 1.1 million COVID-19 deaths in the U.S. by
August 2020. This model heightened concern that the hospital system would be overwhelmed, a
reason cited by President Trump’s Coronavirus Task Force members, Dr. Birx and Dr. Fauci, as
justification for the “15 Days to Flatten the Curve” shutdown (Magness 2020). The question of
where to place blame, or praise, for the handling of the COVID-19 response, like the spread of
the virus, is ongoing. United States politicians almost immediately began pointing the finger at
“the other side” from the first days of public awareness of the novel virus. The federal
government, and specifically former President Trump have come under fire for their approach to
handling the emergency response to the virus’s spread and the economic fallout that followed
(Yoo 2020).
Despite the easy target, it is not the federal government nor the Executive Branch which
bears sole responsibility to deal with public health, both Constitutionally and historically (Olson
2020). State governments hold more power to intervene in the realm of public health and hold
the police powers to initiate and enforce local health-related measures (Yoo 2020). This
paper will analyze the impact of competing COVID-19-related policies as they relate to the
infection rate and death rate. It will also consider population density and population age, extent
of testing, intensity of lockdowns as factors impacting death and infection rates.
This has led to the several states reacting in essentially fifty different manners to the
ongoing spread of the COVID-19 virus. This is considered by some to be the proof of the
resiliency of the federalist system, with states having the best view of on-the-ground conditions
and ability to respond quickly to health crises (Olson 2020). Detractors point to this same
attribute of decentralized authority as an illustration of the negative side of our federalist form of
government, saying the “patchwork response” has enabled the ongoing spread of COVID19 (Haffajee and Mello 2020). Some go as far as saying federalism is the problem, not the
solution in times of crisis and that the states have been abandoned by the federal government’s
lack of leadership and is reason enough to call for the complete overhaul of the American system
of governance (Kreitner 2020).
Root Causes
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States government have not
been able to maintain a common voice about the crisis. As the situation has developed and
conflicting statements about the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic have been published from
U.S government officials, this could be potentially dangerous for the population’s safety (Yeager
2020). As COVID-19 spread through the United States, state governments began to develop
their own policies to slow the spread of the pandemic and established their own lockdown and
reopening dates. This is due to the design of the American political system of federalism which
permits a large measure of self-rule to the states to make their own decisions, letting them
preserve their liberties, and reduce conflict between communities (Nivola 2005). This ability of
the states to pursue their own courses of action in certain situations is enumerated in the 10th
Amendment (Congress 2020).

Federalism has been a fundamental part of U.S public health authority. The rapid spread
of COVID-19 has met a decentralized and piecemeal response, primarily by governors, mayors,
and local health departments of each state. In this pandemic, decentralization as part of
federalism played an important role on the response of the government towards the virus. During
the pandemic, federalism contributed to the flexibility to customize responses for local
populations of unique characteristics, help to maintain state budgets, and test new policies
(Gordon, Huberfeld, and Jones 2020).
The now infamous “15 Days to Slow the Spread” shutdown launched by President Trump
did not end within 15 days in any state that initiated a statewide stay-at-home order (White
House 2020). In February of 2020, Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Disease declared that there was a miniscule risk of COVID-19 spread in
the U.S. and that private individuals did not need to wear masks, two statements he would later
contradict (O’Donnell 2020). Further, President Trump said that the distribution of a vaccine will
be available to the public before the end of 2020, contradicting the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention Director Robert Redfield who stated that a vaccine would not be available until
next spring. Later President Trump said of the CDC director “he’s contradicting himself;
distribution is going to be very rapid” (Naylor and Wise 2020). Previously, the nation’s top
infectious disease expert Dr. Anthony Fauci also contradicted President Trump regarding the
severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. As President Trump pushed to downplay the
surge of cases and pushed to reopen, Dr. Fauci warned in a Wall Street Journal podcast that the
states should seriously consider shutting down due to the resurgence of cases (Gan et al. 2020).
During this pandemic, the CDC has been criticized for conflating the results of two
different types of coronavirus test, which distorted several metrics and provided the country with
an inaccurate picture of the pandemic in the United States (Madrigal and Meyer 2020). These
conflicting messages have been barraging the public with a mixture of inconsistent guidance due
to the novel nature of COVID-19, which is still relatively poorly understood, coupled with
conflicting information from scientist and politicians (Kaiser Health News 2020). Further
confusion also centered around policy prescriptions relating to health mandates for maskwearing and social distancing guidelines. One published study originally concluded that 1,000
counties saw a decrease in hospitalizations after mask mandates were enacted, but the study had
to quickly be retracted because the counties analyzed soon saw a reversal with increased hospital
rates (Adjodah et al. 2020).
In the summer of 2020 officials who had raised concerns regarding the public health
effects of anti-lockdown protests, then turned and condoned or even joined in anti-racism
protests shortly thereafter (Diamond 2020). Public officials across the country, including mayors,
governors, federal health experts and most recently newly elected President Biden have been
observed breaking their own COVID-19-related health rules, mandates and guidelines (Heritage
2021). The “COVID-19 hypocrisy” of public officials regarding health mandates creates
skepticism toward health directives and erodes public trust (Sammin 2021).
Competing Interpretations
The state level responses and policy implementations to COVID-19 have varied widely.
Many states enforced strict lockdown measures such as California, and New York, while a few
resisted state mandated lockdowns all together such as South Dakota and Wyoming (New York
Times 2020). Some reopened businesses and lightened restrictions quickly, such as Georgia and
Florida, while many states continue to shutter certain sectors over six months later (New York

Times 2020). Observers have even pointed out that within individual states the urban and rural
divide is quite distinct, with different population densities and health infrastructure, showing a
one-size-fits-all approach does not work at the state level, let alone the national level (Tuccille
2020). A number of states even proceeded to implement policies attempting to block fellow
American citizens from interstate travel requiring lengthy quarantine periods or even erecting
physical check points at state lines to prevent non-resident travelers (Chertoff 2020).
Researchers note that the spread of COVID-19 from the early hotspots in coastal metro
areas to less populated states did not occur until the stay-at-home orders had been lifted in the
original virus hot spots (Jones and Kiley 2020). The earliest states to lift lockdowns saw an
immediate uptick in interstate travel from states still under lockdown (Shaver 2020). Six months
into the pandemic nearly 50% of cases were still only concentrated in a very narrow geographic
area, representing just 1% of counties (Gonshorowski and Michel 2020).
As the States began to implement mitigation efforts and stay-at-home orders to counter
the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. States such as New York, California,
Michigan, and decided to adopt strict measures and started to issue stay-at-home orders
at earlier times due to the rapid increase of cases in urban areas (Appendix 1). Other states such
as Texas, Georgia, and Florida started to implement less strict orders to slow the spread of the
pandemic later than the previous group. However, some state governors of states such as South
Dakota, Utah, and Iowa decided that the measures taken by the others states such as stay-athome orders were not a net positive trade-off for their states.
As the COVID-19 pandemic started to impact the U.S, California, Washington,
Michigan, New York, and New Jersey were among the states that decided to implement
draconian measures as they started implementing stay-at home orders in late March with a
minimum of 6 weeks, shut down of all non-essential business, schools, and houses of worship
(New York Times 2020).
In contrast, the states of Texas, Georgia, and Florida adopted stay-at-home orders in early
April, later than the previous group, and had an approximate length of 4 weeks under these
measures which also shut down all non-essential business and reopened by early May. However,
unlike the strictest lockdown states, Texas, Florida and Georgia did not implement as strict of
policies, exemplified by allowing churches to remain open (Gjelten 2020). Based on the raw
data, states with lockdowns of six weeks or more, show higher number of deaths per 100
thousand contrasted with the states under the less strict 4-week lockdowns which had higher
infection rates but lower death rates than the 6+ week group (Appendix 1).
In contrast with the two previous groups, the states of South Dakota, Utah, and Iowa were
among the few states where the governors did not issue stay-at-home orders and relied on the
ability of citizens to make their own decisions on how to best navigate the health risks posed by
the COVID-19 (Witte 2020). Based on the raw data from non-lockdown states, these states
present similar numbers in the amount of infection cases per 100 thousand compared to the states
that had lockdowns lasting less than one month, such as Georgia, Florida and Texas. However,
the non-lockdown states had a much lower death rate per 100 thousand. However, one caveat is
that the non-lockdown states tended to have lower population density than many of the states
with either shorter or longer lockdowns (Appendix 1).
The current polarized political climate has extended itself into COVID-19 response. It is
strikingly clear that the extent of lockdowns from state to state has largely been divided along
party lines, with Republican governors leaning toward the least restrictions and earlier reopening,
while Democrat governors have tended toward extensive restrictions and ongoing lockdowns

(Miltimore 2020). The states that tended to have the longest stay-at-home orders have Democrat
governors and the six states with no lockdown or quickest to reopen have Republican governors
(NY Times 2020). The Democrats blamed President Trump for his “failure” to meet the crisis
and Republicans pointed fingers at Democrats for stalling economic relief packages in Congress
and Democrat governors for keeping their states in prolonged lockdowns. Each side casting
blame for the continued effects of the virus, from the death toll to the economic fallout (Bowden
2020). The COVID-19 pandemic of course made its way into the 2020 Presidential election
rhetoric, with then-Democrat nominee Joe Biden incorrectly decrying 120 million COVID-19
deaths in one interview and millions of dead in another instance (Steinbuch 2020).
Impacts
As the country with the most infections in the world, the United States has suffered wide
impacts in several areas by the COVID-19. Through the date used for our statistical analysis,
November 4, 2020, the U.S. had experienced just over 225,000 deaths attributed to COVID-19, a
tally that surpassed 500,000 deaths at the time of this writing on February 25, 2021 (COVID
Tracking Project 2021). The economy has suffered strong repercussions due to the stay-at-home
measures taken starting with a 9.5% drop in GDP the following quarter, a measure which had
never exceeded a 3% drop (Routley 2020). Also, 50 million people remain unemployed as
businesses shut down due to restrictions in most states. Through the CARES Act the government
tried to stop the decline in the consumer spending of 12.6% recorded in April. However,
payments expired in July 31 and were not renewed. As a counter measure, trillions of dollars
were borrowed as an injection of money into the system. Despite the actions, inflation dropped to
almost zero-well below the Fed’s ideal 2% rate-signaling deflationary pressure (Routley 2020).
The U.S has lost more jobs than in the Great Recession, with an employment reduction
by 10 million jobs or 6.5%. Accommodation and Food Services industry had lost 22% of its
employment representing 3 million jobs. The Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation industry has
lost 800,000 jobs as of December 2020. From February to December 2020, state government
employment had dropped 7.2% and a 6.9% drop for local governments which combined
represents close to 1.4 million jobs. Also, nine state governments had a 10% employment
reduction since February 2021. Further, U.S GDP remains 3.4% lower compared to the end of
2019 following a small drop in the first quarter of 2020, a catastrophic drop for the second
quarter, and finally a rebound in the third quarter. Finally, several other industries suffered
employment reduction such as Health Care and Social Assistance with 580,000 jobs, Retail lost
over 400,00 jobs, Management Services near 80,000 jobs, and Administrative, Support and
Waste almost 580,000 and finally Finance and Insurance had an increase of almost 30,000 jobs
(Ettlinger, and Hensley 2021).
As COVID-19 change Americans’ daily lives, the education system also became strained
during this crisis. Students are spending more time at home as many schools remain closed
without residential classes, affecting their performance and mental health (Soland et al. 2020).
COVID-19 led to school closures and negative outcomes for school children and their parents.
Studies show that these detrimental effects may last beyond the immediate. Negative long-term
effects of lockdowns could stay with school age children for life (Christakis, Van Cleve,
Zimmerman 2020). On the other side, teachers struggle to adapt the educational content to fit an
improvise online platform not only for private but also public schools. Parents face the challenge
of taking care of their children while still meeting work responsibilities, as they carry the
additional load of their children’s day to day education (Soland et al. 2020).

Experts note that overall mental health of the population has declined dramatically as an
outcome of the solitary nature of stay-at-home orders and ongoing social distancing measures
(Kilgore et al. 2020). As multiple sectors in the U.S have been impacted by the pandemic,
repercussions in the mental health of the population can be observed, some experts describing
this crisis as an epidemiological and psychological situation. Living in isolation, job loss,
financial hardship, and grief over the death of loved ones have been main causes for
individuals to develop anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and suicide among the population
(American Psychological Association 2020).
Closures of universities and loss of income have been pandemic-related consequences
that may contribute to poor mental health for young adults, 56% of whom experience symptoms
of anxiety and/or depressive disorder. Young adults compared to adults, are more likely to report
substance use, 25% vs. 13%, and suicidal thoughts, 26% vs. 11%. During the pandemic, adults
exposed to job loss and lower incomes reported an increase of 53% for mental illness compared
to only 32% for those without job or income loss. Also, 13% of adults reported new or increased
substance use due to the coronavirus-related stress until June 2020, and 11% thoughts of suicide
in the past 30 days (Panchal et al. 2021).
The pandemic also collided with the 2020 presidential elections in the U.S as a potential
threat that led to changes in voting, methods, preferences and outcomes. Some states decided to
postpone primary elections or chose to utilize vote-by-mail as the number of infections continued
to increase (John Hopkins University 2020). These measures brought different opinions among
society, as Republicans asserted that voting by mail favors Democrat politicians or possible
fraud. Also, Democrats explain that the Republican’s opposition to mail-in-ballots is because it
makes it easier for minorities and immigrants to vote as those groups don’t tend to favor the
Republican Party (Dickie 2020).
During 2020 presidential elections, 26.6 million mail-in votes were cast out of nearly 53
million total votes. The number of voters who cast their ballots by mail increased this year across
several states. Nevada is an example where 98.4% of the more than 491,600 votes in the state
primary were mail ballots, while in 2018 it was less than 9%. The COVID-19 pandemic showed
a direct effect on mail voting patterns for 2020. Before March 13, the average by-mail share in
primaries was 11.3%. After Trump declared the pandemic a national emergency, the average was
51.5%. About 65% of Americans agreed that the option to vote early or absentee should be
available to any voter without requiring a documented reason. Also, there was a higher number
of Democrats and Democrats-leaning independents than Republicans supporting “no excuse”
absentee or early voting (83% vs. 44%). Finally, 58% of Joe Biden supporters said they prefer to
send their vote by mail, while only 17% of Trump supporters agreed with this system (Desilver
2020).

MethodologyResearch Question: Did lengthier state-level Lockdowns intended to curb
the spread of COVID-19 result in lower infection and death totals than occurred in states with no
or shorter lockdowns?
The predictor variable in this study was lockdown time length. We employed multiple
quasi-Poisson regression because of the larger number of predictor variables which needed to be
controlled. Quasi-Poisson was chosen due to all outcome variables being measured are rates and
the need to measure number of days on state under stay-at-home-orders (i.e., lockdowns). The

outcome variables were quantitative, measuring death rate and infection case rate. The
confounding variables included in our analysis are median age, population density, state
population, state health index, prevalence of obesity, COVID testing/100k, COVID cases/100k,
COVID deaths/100k, COVID fatality rate, percent of population inactive, percent of population
active, mass transit trips per capita, percent American Indian, percent Asian, percent Black,
percent Hispanic, percent other race, percent White, and whether the state had a Democrat
governor or Republican governor. Further, we tested two main hypothesis and alternatives.
Hypothesis 1 (null): There is no relationship between the predictor variable of longer
lockdowns and the outcome variable of COVID-19 death totals
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relationship between the outcome variable of longer
lockdowns and COVID-19 death totals (the longer the lockdown, the lower the death totals)
Hypothesis 2 (null): There is no relationship between the predictor variable of longer
lockdowns and the outcome variable of COVID-19 infection rates
Hypothesis 2: There is an inverse relationship between the outcome variable of longer
lockdowns and COVID-19 infection rates (the longer the lockdown, the lower the infection
rate)
Results
We estimate that the states with 2-4 weeks of lockdown had 31% lower odds of having
confirmed cases of COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown where the two states have
similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population who is
inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles. We estimate that a state with 4-6
weeks of lockdown had a 34% lower odds to have confirmed cases of COVID-19 compared to a
state with no lockdown for two states with similar population densities, median ages, health
indices, percentage of the population who is inactive, public transit usage, and racial
demographic profiles. We estimate that a state with 6+ weeks of lockdown had the a 48% lower
odds of having confirmed cases of COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown for two
states with similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population
who is inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
We estimate that the states with 2-4 weeks of lockdown had 23% lower odds to have a
death from COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown where the two states have similar
population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population who is inactive,
public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles. We estimate that a state with 4-6 weeks of
lockdown had a 25% lower odds to have a death due to COVID-19 compared to a state with no
lockdown for two states with similar population densities, median ages, health indices,
percentage of the population who is inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic
profiles. We estimate that a state with 6+ weeks of lockdown had 15% lower odds to have a
death from COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown for two states with similar
population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population who is inactive,
public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles. 6+ weeks of lockdown is the only setting
where the odds of dying are statistically higher than in the no lockdown case. This relationship is

fairly strongly driven by New York, which is exactly why time series data would be much better
for this type of analysis.
Discussion
Our findings regarding a positive or negative correlation between lockdown length and COVID19 death and infection rates are inconclusive. States with a variety of lockdown policies had a
wide variety of death and infection rates. At face value the raw data can easily be interpreted to
show states with no lockdown having far lower death rates than many states with longer
lockdowns, while states with long lockdowns tended to have lower infection rates, but a higher
fatality rate. However, the date of first COVID-19 infection and population demographics are
vastly different, leading to incongruous comparisons. Raw data is misleading, but policymakers
in such situations will have little reaction time and imperfect data for decision making lending
credence to the efficacy of decentralized decision making.
Limitations
The major limitations that this methodology encountered include the ambiguity of whether the
death rate caused the need for lockdowns or if the lockdowns contributed to an increased death
rate. Furthermore, there is a paucity of states with similar demographics to properly compare the
effect of various policy approaches specific to lockdown length.
Recommendations
Our recommendations for further research would to be to utilize time series data to analyze the
effect of lockdowns on death and infection rates by controlling for the number of days that
transpired from first COVID-19 infection to first day of stay-at-home order. Finally, we
recommend the use of metro area or county level data rather than state level data to better
understand the differences of various lockdown policies in areas with more similar
demographics.
Table A: Descriptive Statistics
Below are the means and standard deviations of the variables provided stratified by the 4
lockdown lengths that are used to define levels of “lockdown severity.” The last two rows include
breakdowns of the number of states with a Governor who is Republican vs Democrat.

No Lockdown

2-4 Weeks

4-6 Weeks

6+ Weeks

(N=7)

(N=15)

(N=16)

46 (40.5, 53)

68 (62, 75)

Number Days Home

0 (0,0)

(N=12)
29 (28.5, 34)

Median Age

37.7(35.15, 38.3)

37.8(36.95, 39.65

39 (38.15, 41.25)

39.6(38.85, 40.5)

Population Density

25.2(11.35, 47.75

60.55 (24.85, 138.3

89.3 (65.9, 220.8)

224.25 (164.3, 456.2)
8,025,909.72 (2,833,888.69, 11,038,547.23)

State Population

1,929,148.22 (821,103.42, 3,085,003.45)

3,488,924 (2,332,967.66, 5,927,015.2)

5,699,580.93 (2,997,749.76, 6,409,819.27)

Health Index

0.3 (0.22, 0.35)

0.35 (-0.71, 0.03)

0.23 (-0.31, 0.39

0.22 (-0.24, 0.58)

Obesity

33.9 (31.1, 34.6)

34.15 (29.5, 34.6)

30.1 (27.6, 33.05)

30.65 (27.25, 33.25)

Testing/100k

44,336 (29,071, 46,842.5)

35,006.5 (28,048.5, 48,016.5)

47,358 (42,497, 57,037.5)

47,296 (38,019, 59,683)

Cases/100k

3,839 (3,782, 4,888)

3,430.5 (3,252, 3,877.5)

2,800 (1,715.5, 3,375)

2,266 (1,806, 2,643.5)

Deaths/100k

50 (26.5, 60.5)

55 (35.5, 69.5)

45 (31, 74)

59 (38.5, 104)

COVID Fatality Rate

0.01 (0.01, 0.01)

0.01 (0.01, 0.02)

0.02 (0.02, 0.02)

0.03 (0.02, 0.05)

Percent Inactive

25.4 (24.95, 26.65)

29.5 (26.45, 32.05)

25.2 (22, 29.2)

25.25 (24, 28.1)

Percent Active

50.8 (47.95, 53.95

47 (43.75, 51.95)

51.1 (48.8, 57)

50.2 (48.4, 52.75)

Transit Trips/capita

18 (9.5, 25)

19 (8, 44.5)

61 (45.5, 71)

82.5 (47, 90.5)

% American Indian

1 (0.65, 4.15)

0.55 (0.25, 3.5)

0.4 (0.25, 0.7)

0.2 (0.1, 0.35)

% Asian

1.7 (1.4, 2.4)

1.95 (1.3, 4.35)

2.8 (1.9, 3.95)

4.25 (2.8, 7.55)

% Black

10.35 (4.2, 26.75)

% Hispanic

3 (1.55, 3.9)
7.4 (4.75, 10.45)

5.5 (3.4, 10.3)
6.9 (4.7, 18.45)

11.45 (5.25, 14.15)
9.95 (6.2, 16.65)

% Other

2.4 (2.05, 2.7)

2.6 (2, 3.75)

2.7 (2.15, 3.05)

2.55 (2.1, 2.9)

% White

82.3 (78.65, 84.2)

64.55 (54.6, 74.9)

75.6 (56.6, 80.55)

64.85 (58.15, 75.7)

Democrat Gov

0 (0%)

3 (25%)

8 (53%)

13 (81%)

Republican Gov

7 (100%)

9 (75%)

7 (47%)

3 (19%)

8.3 (4.75, 12.15)

Median (IQR = 25 percentile in data, 75 percentiles in data) for everything except “Democrat Gov”
and “Republican Gov”
“Democrat Gov” and “Republican Gov” are number in group (% of group)

Table B: COVID Cases per Capita
Table of Results for the model:
In (COVID cases per capita) = b0 + b1 *(2-4week lockdown) +b2 *(4-6week lockdown) +b3
*(6+week lockdown) +
b4*(population density) +
b5*(median age) + b6*(health index) +
b7*(percent
inactive) + b8*(Transit Trips Per Capita) + b9*(% of Indigenous)
+ b10*(% Asian) + b11*(% Non-Hispanic Black) + b12*(% Hispanic) +
b13*(Non-Hispanic White)
B0 is uninterpreted.
The interpretation of b1 is: we estimate that the states with 2-4 weeks of lockdown had 31%
lower odds of having confirmed cases of COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown
where the two states have similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of
the population who is inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
● Note: 31% = (1 - 0.6929 )*100% (and rounded)
● Note: the confidence interval runs from 46% lower odds to 11% lower odds.
Thus, (technically) the conclusion can be made that a 2–4-week lockdown was
successful in decreasing the rate of COVID-19 cases compared to states that
performed no such lockdown.

○

It is very possible that the number and the increase is an artifact of small
sample size and some uncollected confounder.
● Note: the odds are defined as (probability an event occurs/(1-probability an event
occurs). In this case, that means that the odds of have a confirmed case of
COVID-19 is (probability of someone testing positive for COVID-19 in this
state)/(1-probability of someone testing positive for COVID-19 in this state)
○ Of important note: the odds are the same as a probability.
■ ODDS =/= PROBABILITY
■ ODDS =/= CHANCE
The interpretation of b2 is: we estimate that a state with 4-6 weeks of lockdown had a 34% lower
odds to have confirmed cases of COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown for two states
with similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population who
is inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
● Note: 34% = (1- 0.658)*100% (and rounded)
● Note: the confidence interval runs from 52% lower odds to 10% lower odds.
Thus, (technically) the conclusion can be made that a 4-6 week lockdown was
successful in decreasing the rate of COVID-19 cases compared to states that
performed no such lockdown.
○ It is very possible that the number and the increase is an artifact of small
sample size and some uncollected confounder.
● Note: the odds are defined as (probability an event occurs/(1-probability an event
occurs). In this case, that means that the odds of have a confirmed case of
COVID-19 is (probability of someone testing positive for COVID-19 in this
state)/(1-probability of someone testing positive for COVID-19 in this state)
○ Of important note: the odds are the same as a probability.
■ ODDS =/= PROBABILITY
■ ODDS =/= CHANCE

The interpretation of b3 is: we estimate that a state with 6+ weeks of lockdown had the a 48%
lower odds of having confirmed cases of COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown for
two states with similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the
population who is inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
● Note: 48% = (1- 0.5175)*100% (and rounded)
● Note: the confidence interval runs from 60% lower odds to 34% lower odds.
Thus, (technically) the conclusion can be made that a 6+ week lockdown was
successful in decreasing the rate of COVID-19 cases compared to states that
performed no such lockdown.

○

It is very possible that the number and the increase is an artifact of small
sample size and some uncollected confounder.
● Note: the odds are defined as (probability an event occurs/(1-probability an event
occurs). In this case, that means that the odds of have a confirmed case of
COVID-19 is (probability of someone testing positive for COVID-19 in this
state)/(1-probability of someone testing positive for COVID-19 in this state)
○ Of important note: the odds are the same as a probability.
■ ODDS =/= PROBABILITY
■ ODDS =/= CHANCE
Intercept
2-4 Week Lockdown
4-6 Week Lockdown
6+ Week Lockdown
Population Density
Median Age
Health Index
Percent Inactive
Transit Usage
American Indian
Asian
NH Black
Hispanic
NH-White

Exponentiated Coefficients
2.00E-04
0.6929
0.6580
0.5175
1.0002
1.0009
0.9558
1.0091
1.0010
1.0985
1.0472
1.0627
1.0549
1.0530

95% Confidence Interval
(0, 0.2313)
(0.5383, 0.8919)
(0.4797, 0.9026)
(0.404, 0.6628)
(0.9999, 1.0004)
(0.9755, 1.0269)
(0.6623, 1.3793)
(0.6623, 1.3793)
(0.9949, 1.0071)
(0.9951, 1.2125)
(0.9557, 1.1475)
(0.9872, 1.144)
(0.9803, 1.1352)
(0.9746, 1.1378)

P-Value
0.0183
0.0044
0.0094
0
0.1768
0.9474
0.809
0.5817
0.7519
0.0624
0.3229
0.1057
0.1534
0.1909

Table C: COVID Cases per Capita
ln(COVID deaths per capita) = b0 + b1 *(2-4week lockdown) +b2 *(4-6week lockdown) +b3
*(6+week lockdown) +
b4*(population
density)
+
b5*(median age) + b6*(health index) +
b7*(percent
inactive) + b8*(Transit Trips Per Capita) + b9*(% of Indigineous)
+ b10*(% Asian) + b11*(% Non-Hispanic Black) + b12*(% Hispanic) +
b13*(Non Hispanic White)
B0 is uninterpreted.
The interpretation of b1 is: we estimate that the states with 2-4 weeks of lockdown had 23%
lower odds to have a death from COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown where the
two states have similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the
population who is inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
● Note: 23% = (1 - 0.7672)*100% (and rounded)
● Note: the confidence interval runs from 45% lower odds to 8% higher odds.
Thus, no conclusion can be made about an increase of 23% lower odds meaning
anything at all. It is very possible that the number and the increase is an artifact
of small sample size and some uncollected confounder.
● Note: the odds are defined as (probability an event occurs/(1-probability an event
occurs). In this case, that means that the odds of have a death due to COVID-19
is (probability of someone dying from COVID-19 in this state)/(1-probability of
someone dying from COVID-19 in this state)

○ Of important note: the odds are the same as a probability.
■ ODDS =/= PROBABILITY
■ ODDS =/= CHANCE

The interpretation of b2 is: we estimate that a state with 4-6 weeks of lockdown had a 25% lower
odds to have a death due to COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown for two states with
similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population who is
inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
● Note: 25% = (1 - 0.7539)*100% (and rounded)
● Note: the confidence interval runs from 49% lower odds to 12% higher odds.
Thus, no conclusion can be made about an increase of 25% lower odds meaning
anything at all. It is very possible that the number and the increase is an artifact
of small sample size and some uncollected confounder.
● Note: the odds are defined as (probability an event occurs/(1-probability an event
occurs). In this case, that means that the odds of have a death due to COVID-19
is (probability of someone dying from COVID-19 in this state)/(1-probability of
someone dying from COVID-19 in this state)
○ Of important note: the odds are the same as a probability.
■ ODDS =/= PROBABILITY
■ ODDS =/= CHANCE
The interpretation of b3 is: we estimate that a state with 6+ weeks of lockdown had 15% lower
odds to have a death from COVID-19 compared to a state with no lockdown for two states with
similar population densities, median ages, health indices, percentage of the population who is
inactive, public transit usage, and racial demographic profiles.
● Note: 15% = (1 -0.8522)*100% (and rounded)
● Note: the confidence interval runs from 44% lower odds to 30% higher odds.
Thus, no conclusion can be made about an increase of 15% lower odds meaning
anything at all. It is very possible that the number and the increase is an artifact
of small sample size and some uncollected confounder.
● Note: the odds are defined as (probability an event occurs/(1-probability an event
occurs). In this case, that means that the odds of have a death due to COVID-19
is (probability of someone dying from COVID-19 in this state)/(1-probability of
someone dying from COVID-19 in this state)
○ Of important note: the odds are the same as a probability.
■ ODDS =/= PROBABILITY
■ ODDS =/= CHANCE

Intercept
2-4 Week Lockdown
4-6 Week Lockdown
6+ Week Lockdown
Population Density
Median Age
Health Index
Percent Inactive
Transit Usage
American Indian
Asian
NH Black
Hispanic
NH-White

Exponentiated Coeffecients
0
0.7672
0.7539
0.8522
1.0002
1.0503
1.3635
1.075
1.0086
1.268
1.1954
1.1804
1.1611
1.1612

95% Confidence Interval
(0,0)
(0.5469, 1.0762)
(0.5067, 1.1215)
(0.5594, 1.2982)
(0.9996, 1.0009)
(0.9997, 1.1035)
(0.8202, 2.2666)
(1.0196, 1.1335)
(1.0016, 1.0155)
(1.0619, 1.5141)
(1.0228, 1.3972)
(1.0459, 1.3322)
(1.0312, 1.3074)
(1.0261, 1.3141)

P-Value
0
0.1249
0.1633
0.4563
0.4651
0.0513
0.2318
0.0074
0.0152
0.0087
0.0249
0.0072
0.0136
0.0178

Table D: COVID Cases per Capita
ln(COVID deaths per case) = b0 + b1 *(2-4week lockdown) +b2 *(4-6week lockdown) +b3
*(6+week lockdown) +
b4*(population
density)
+
b5*(median age) + b6*(health index) +
b7*(percent
inactive) + b8*(Transit Trips Per Capita) + b9*(% of Indigineous)
+ b10*(% Asian) + b11*(% Non-Hispanic Black) + b12*(% Hispanic) +
b13*(Non Hispanic White)

Note: interpretations will be the same. But now we have increased odds of dying per confirmed
case of COVID-19.
Also Note: 6+ weeks of lockdown is the only setting where the odds of dying are statistically
higher than in the no lockdown case. This relationship is fairly strongly driven by New York,
which is exactly why I think time series data are much better for this type of analysis.
Intercept
2-4 Week Lockdown
4-6 Week Lockdown
6+ Week Lockdown
Population Density
Median Age
Health Index
Percent Inactive
Transit Usage
American Indian
Asian
NH Black
Hispanic
NH-White

Exponentiated Coefficients
0
1.1945
1.2164
1.7156
1.0002
1.0454
1.4447
1.0625
1.0064
1.1399
1.129
1.0985
1.0872
1.0906

95% Confidence Interval
(0, 2e-04)
(0.7631, 1.87)
(0.7196, 2.056)
(1.0297, 2.8586)
(0.9996, 1.0007)
(0.9948, 1.0985)
(0.8372, 2.4931)
(1.0078, 1.1203)
(0.9981, 1.0147)
(1.0083, 1.2887)
(1.0052, 1.2681)
(1.0211, 1.1819)
(1.0144, 1.1653)
(1.0092, 1.1786)

P-Value
1E-04
0.4369
0.4646
0.0382
0.5417
0.0795
0.1863
0.0246
0.1302
0.0365
0.0407
0.0118
0.0181
0.0284

For both analyses, quasi-Poisson regression was used to model the rate of deaths per capita and
cases per capita while also accounting for the mean variance relationship and overdispersion in

the data. Confidence intervals and p-values are reported using a robust variance estimator due to
the belief that the counts are not truly Poisson and that there is potential problem with the
variance estimates as is.
The below are using 2019 data that does not include any measure of “hispanic”
ln(COVID cases per capita) = b0 + b1 *(2-4week lockdown) +b2 *(4-6week lockdown) +b3
*(6+week lockdown) +
b4*(population
density)
+
b5*(median age) + b6*(health index) +
b7*(percent
inactive) + b8*(Transit Trips Per Capita) + b9*(% of Indigineous)
+ b10*(% Asian) + b11*(% Black) + b12*(White)

Intercept
2-4 Week Lockdown
4-6 Week Lockdown
6+ Week Lockdown
Population Density
Median Age
Health Index
Percent Inactive
Transit Usage
American Indian
Asian
Black
White

Exponentiated Coefficients
0.0213
0.7045
0.671
0.5078
1.0002
0.9955
0.9314
1.0109
1.0017
1.0306
0.9957
1.0119
1.0045

95% Confidence Interval
(0.0061, 0.074)
(0.5574, 0.8905)
(0.4881, 0.9226)
(0.3905, 0.6603)
(1, 1.0004)
(0.9705, 1.0212)
(0.6279, 1.3815)
(0.9777, 1.0454)
(0.9952, 1.0081)
(1.005, 1.0569)
(0.9931, 0.9984)
(0.9998, 1.0242)
(0.994, 1.0151)

P-Value
0
0.0034
0.0141
0
0.0859
0.7297
0.7238
0.524
0.6162
0.0188
0.0016
0.0535
0.4014

ln(COVID deaths per capita) = b0 + b1 *(2-4week lockdown) +b2 *(4-6week lockdown) +b3
*(6+week lockdown) +
b4*(population
density)
+
b5*(median age) + b6*(health index) +
b7*(percent
inactive) + b8*(Transit Trips Per Capita) + b9*(% of Indigineous)
+ b10*(% Asian) + b11*(%Black) + b12*(White)

Intercept
2-4 Week Lockdown
4-6 Week Lockdown
6+ Week Lockdown
Population Density
Median Age
Health Index
Percent Inactive
Transit Usage
American Indian
Asian
Black
White

Exponentiated Coefficients
0
0.7458
0.7054
0.7876
1.0004
1.0472
1.3713
1.0776
1.0098
1.0589
0.9978
1.0164
0.9985

95% Confidence Interval
(0, 1e-04)
(0.5388, 1.0323)
(0.4801, 1.0364)
(0.5182, 1.1971)
(0.9997, 1.001)
(0.9902, 1.1076)
(0.7811, 2.4074)
(1.0196, 1.139)
(1.0025, 1.0172)
(0.9914, 1.1309)
(0.9904, 1.0053)
(0.9923, 1.041)
(0.9842, 1.0131)

P-Value
0
0.077
0.0754
0.2637
0.2551
0.1063
0.2715
0.0081
0.0087
0.0885
0.5667
0.185
0.8426

In (COVID deaths per case) = b0 + b1 *(2-4week lockdown) +b2 *(4-6week lockdown) +b3
*(6+week lockdown) +
b4*(population
density)
+
b5*(median age) + b6*(health index) +
b7*(percent
inactive) + b8*(Transit Trips Per Capita) + b9*(% of Indigineous)
+ b10*(% Asian) + b11*(% Black) + b12*(White)
Intercept
2-4 Week Lockdown
4-6 Week Lockdown
6+ Week Lockdown
Population Density
Median Age
Health Index
Percent Inactive
Transit Usage
American Indian
Asian
Black
White

Exponentiated Coefficients
5.00E-04
1.128
1.1183
1.6241
1.0003
1.0451
1.5169
1.0591
1.0066
1.0257
1.0025
1.0076
0.9953

95% Confidence Interval
(0, 0.0072)
(0.7474, 1.7026)
(0.6832, 1.8302)
(0.983, 2.6834)
(0.9997, 1.0008)
(0.9881, 1.1053)
(0.8706, 2.6429)
(1.0067, 1.1142)
(0.9982, 1.015)
(0.9713, 1.0831)
(0.9961, 1.009)
(0.9886, 1.0269)
(0.9814, 1.0094)

P-Value
0
0.5662
0.6566
0.0584
0.3245
0.1234
0.1413
0.0267
0.1228
0.3617
0.4453
0.4358
0.512

Appendix 1

No Lockdown
16 Days-1 month
1 month-1.5 month
1.5 monthsIndefinite
Lockdown Duration
Length of Stay at
Home (Days)
Median Age
Population Density
(per mile square)
Health Index
Obesity
Extent of testing per
100k November 3
Cases per 100k
COVID case total
November 4
COVID death total
November 4, 2020
COVID case fatality
rate
COVID deaths per
100,000
Percent of NonExercising adults
Percentage of active
adults (150 min
exercise per week)
Transit trips per
capita (US DOT
score)
Political Affiliation of
Governor (1=D, 2=R)
American Indian or
Alaska Native Alone
Asian Alone
Black or African
American Alone
Native Hawaiian And
Other Pacific Islander
Some other race
alone
Two or More Races
alone
White Alone

New
York

New
Jersey

California

Michigan

0
0
3

0
0
0

0
0
0

0

4

4

3

4

4

4
4

47
37

67
39.8

84
39.2

81
40.2

253.7

176.7

412.8

0.398
26.2

-0.209
36

47383
2363

0
0
0

Georgia

Florida

South
Dakota

0
2
0

0
2
0

0
0
3

1
0
0

1
0
0

1
0
0

0

0

0

2

2

3

0
1

0
1

0
1

29
35.1

29
37.2

32
42.4

0
37.7

0
31.2

0
38.5

Texas

Utah

Iowa

111

184.6

400.7

0.512
27.1

1207.8
0.553
25.7

-0.204
34

-0.447
33.1

-0.213
27

11.7
0.149
33

39
0.628
29.2

56.5
0.289
33.9

49136
2080

75102
2647

52285
2726

28425
3194

34071
3466

47358
3784

29716
5538

44336
3776

28426
4238

934672

207763

517015

242825

916773

364589

805924

48854

119375

133762

17666

7761

33324

16371

18194

8029

16890

446

602

1765

0.0189

0.037

0.064

0.067

0.020

0.022

0.021

0.009

0.005

0.013

44

77

170.62

183

63

76

79

50

19

55

20

27.2

27.2

29

32.1

31

29.2

24.9

21.1

25

57.5

49.5

49.3

48.9

41.9

46.1

49.5

50.8

54

50.2

86

50

99

99

52

65

61

9

31

41

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

0.81
14.84

0.57
3.28

0.38
8.64

0.21
9.64

0.5
4.99

0.4
4.14

0.28
2.79

8.57
1.3

1.1
2.39

0.8
2.41

5.78

13.73

15.85

13.55

12.26

31.94

16.02

2.36

1.15

4.1

0.39

0.02

0.04

0.04

0.09

0.07

0.08

0.23

0.96

0.06

13.73

1.14

8.55

6.43

5.91

3.03

3.35

0.67

3.85

1.01

5.01
59.44

3.03
78.22

3.34
63.2

2.98
67.15

2.88
73.37

2.68
57.75

2.94
74.54

2.79
84.07

3.23
87.32

2.16
89.87
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